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INTRODUCTION
Toward the end of the last century, the painted facade of
legal formalism began to craze and crack, revealing the distor-
tions beneath. The formalist project attempted to explain law
as autonomous, non-coercive, non-consequentialist, acontextual
and, most of all, "non-political... [a] buffer between state and
society."' The formalist separated law and politics to escape
from the tyranny of the majority into the realm of neutral
principles, safe from legislative majorities and able to withstand
their redistributive tendencies. In such a realm, a judicial
decision was non-political even when it struck down legislation
derived from "neutral" principles. The judicial process was
analogous to the scientific method, using reason to move from
the concrete to the abstract, deriving particular decisions from
timeless general principles and vice versa.2
By the twentieth century, the realities of a rapidly expand-
ing economy, a developing oligopoly of industry, the organization
of workers, and a growing, diverse, and demanding population3
were destroying the ability of the formalist paradigm to mediate
among contending forces. The notion of a jurisprudence analo-
gous to science crumbled at the realist recognition that neutral
principles could not be found. But, the desire for law to assume
a non-political character, in order to play a mediating and
legitimating role, had not disappeared. The attempt to find a
realm of neutral principles justifying anti-majoritarianism was
too attractive to abandon completely even though the project to
discover a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" had failed.
Today, at the close of the twentieth century, there continue
to be those who seek a model that delegitimates majoritarian
legislation on the basis that it is inconsistent with neutral
principles of law. Two leading public choice scholars tell us that
"[d]emocracy - understood as rule by the people or its represen-
tatives - is fundamentally at odds with the rule of law."4 They
1 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-
1960, at 9 (1992).
2 For an interesting explanation of the nature of the "science" that formal-
ism practiced, see Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV.
1, 16-32 (1983).
3 ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 489 (1977).
4 John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 567-68 (1992).
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argue that democracy is "arbitrary" and exhibits "internal chaos
and contradiction."5 The new attack on majoritarianism does
not rely on law transcendent, although it does tend to claim
scientific sanction. This anti-majoritarian movement seeks to
show that legislative majorities are unable to produce law that
is coherent, consistent, intelligible, or in a large sense, purpose-
ful. Not only is the legislative process flawed, but legislation
itself is the factional attempt to utilize the state's coercive
power for private, and generally redistributive, ends. The
legislative arena is both contrasted with the market-
place - conceived as. a neutral, non-coercive, and voluntary
mechanism for social decision-making - and compared to the
marketplace. Public choice theory models a political world
equivalent to the economic market, in which legislative deci-
sions are bought and sold.
Public choice theorists begin with what is conceived of as a
natural institution, the market. The building block of this
theoretical construct is the single individual in a two-party
exchange. One individual trades with another. Neither individ-
ual is required to participate, nor would she if she did not judge
the exchange to be in her interest. Market exchange is an
interaction of free equals. In public choice theory, it is the
paradigm for all human interactions which should be equally
voluntary and self-interested. The multiplicity of individual
transactions makes a market which, left to itself, will regulate
human interaction to the best advantage.
The next step in constructing public choice theory is the
normative extension of this model to collective, or governmental,
decision-making. Like individual decision-making in the mar-
ket, it too should be non-coercive, that is unanimous. Unani-
mous decisions are voluntary and represent the perceived self-
interest of all parties to the decision. The state which acts only
on the basis of unanimous decisions is by definition neutral and
non-coercive.
Decisions made by a majority, on the other hand, force the
state out of the preferred position of neutrality and require it to
take sides. Enforcement of a majoritarian decision puts the
power of the state in the hands of one group - only a portion of
the whole - which imposes its will on another. The paradig-
matic majoritarian decision is to redistribute wealth: the non-
wealthy majority confiscates the wealth of the wealthy minority.
5 Id. at 568.
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Because some parties suffer, this outcome could not occur
unanimously and is thus impossible under a market-exchange
model of law. This, in short and standing on one foot, is the
normative public choice account of law and state. In this
article, by examining the writing of one of its leading propo-
nents, I will argue that the public choice account is not entirely
coherent.
Public choice theory arose parallel to, and slightly behind,
the Chicago School law and economics movement's framing of
the free market as the source of and rationale for not only
wealth and liberty, but the legal system as well.6 The public
choice movement of the Virginia School also attacked the post-
New Deal social compact by focusing on the process of legisla-
tive decision-making, ostensibly in place of examining its sub-
stance.7
Like the Chicagoans a decade before, the Virginians moved
into legal academia.8 Public choice theory has since made
major contributions to the study of public law and legislation.
Its fundamental assumptions, however, have not received wide
exposure. This article examines those foundations as presented
in the works of James M. Buchanan, the 1986 Nobel Laureate
in Economics and a central public choice theorist.
The Chicagoans argue that outcomes legitimate the superi-
ority of the market as a form of collective decision-
making - the market is the most efficient means to allocate
resources. The work of the state is at best secondary and at
worst inefficient. At best, the state can protect initial entitle-
ments and police the forum of private transactions. At worst,
the state may redistribute wealth and hinder economic growth.
6 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
Judge Posner is the leading advocate of Chicago School law and economics.
7 Public choice theory is often referred to as Virginia School theory since
two of its leading proponents, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock,
Buchanan's close collaborator for many years, taught in the Commonwealth.
Buchanan attributes the phrase to Mancur Olson and Christopher Clague.
James M. Buchanan, Politics, Property and the Law: An Alternative Inter-
pretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene, 15 J.L. & ECON. 439, 439 n.3 (1972).
8 In fact, the distinction between Chicago and Virginia may be somewhat
Procrustean. Chicago academicians have applied Virginia-type analysis to a
variety of governmental regulations. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, The Effects of
Automobile Safety Regulation, in CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
349 (George J. Stigler ed., 1988); B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regula-
tion: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, in CHICAGO STUDIES IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra, at 498.
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Two further propositions flow from this: first, state intervention
in the market is warranted only to correct market failure;
second, the common law, effectively the outcome of the day-to-
day interactions of market participants, orders the market more
efficiently than statutory law, the artificial creature of the
legislative state.
Persuasive as this may be, it is insufficient, standing alone,
to overcome the presumption, apparently central to our constitu-
tion, that majority rule, however hemmed about by checks and
balances, is the engine of the state created by the framers of the
document. That presumption provides some legitimacy for state
action that is inefficient, in the sense of producing outcomes
different from those to be realized in a perfectly-functioning
market. The majority may approve whatever the constitution
does not forbid, and the constitution does not speak of efficiency.
Chicagoans are reduced to arguing the general normative point
that efficiency ought to play a central role in democratic deci-
sion-making, attacking, on policy grounds, specific pieces of
legislation as inconsistent with the public interest in efficiency.
Law and economics theorists, seeking to free the market from
inefficient legal constraints, concentrated on the supply side, the
promulgation of law.
Public choice theory focused on the demand side - interest
groups' desire for certain political outcomes and their willing-
ness to purchase such outcomes from political actors. The
public choice critique of public policy was ostensibly directed not
at its inefficiency, but at its origins in private interests. That
critique also concluded that majority rule was necessarily
incoherent, due to the nature of voting. Thus, Virginians
proposed a meta-solution to the problem of delegitimating
majority rule: the claim that it is not in fact democratic, or, at
least, is incapable of providing outcomes that are stable, consis-
tent or coherent.
Unlike some Chicago theorists,9 Virginian theorists advo-
cated change more profound than the mere reinstitution of
judicial review of economic regulation. They called for a revolu-
tionary change in the constitutional compact. James M.
Buchanan, General Advisory Director of the Center for Public
Choice at George Mason University, is an ardent proponent of
9 See, e.g., Richard A- Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds
of Error, in EcoNoM c LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 39 (James A. Dorn &
Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
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revising the constitutional compact. "[B]asic constitutional
reform, even revolution, may be needed .... At the very least,
it seems to be time that genuine constitutional change be
considered seriously."'1
In this article, I examine Buchanan's claims to have devised
both an exchange-based description of constitutional govern-
ment and a prescription for reform. After outlining Buchanan's
fundamentally individualistic assumptions in Part I and his
account of the state in Part II, I argue in Part III that there are
serious short-comings in Buchanan's account, the most impor-
tant of which are the derivation of the initial contract from a
non-original position, Buchanan's inability to justify coherently
the unanimity requirement, and his failure to establish a basis
from which to distinguish decisions that must be unanimous
from those that need not be. In Part IV, I analyze Buchanan's
normative proposals for constitutional change and argue that
they are based upon principles inconsistent with his previous
assumptions. In the Conclusion, I suggest that Buchanan has
been led astray by his categorical identification of the market
with volition and the state with coercion, a philosophy similar to
that of nineteenth-century legal formalism.
I. EXCHANGE AND INDIVIDUAL
A. THE PARABLES OF PRiVATE LAW
Buchanan is perhaps the leading advocate of contractarian
law and economics. He sees in contractarianism a "genuine
economic theory of law,"" a non-positivist account of the devel-
opment of legal institutions, and a prescription for a non-majori-
tarian constitution. 12  While utilitarian law and economics
focuses on whether legal and political outcomes are efficient,
13
contractarians contend their theory is non-consequentialist, that
is, not oriented to results. They claim to look to the process and
10 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LnITs OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND
LEVIATHAN 169 (1975).
n Id. at 53.
12 JAMEs M. BUCHANAN, From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy:
The Development of Public Choice, in CONsTITUTIONAL ECONOMICs 29, 35-36
(1991).
13 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 6, passim, for a model which utilizes
wealth-maximization as the measure of efficiency.
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limit their concern with results to whether outcomes are the
product of, or promote, free and voluntary exchange. The
contractarians' validating model for institutions, legal and
political, is the market; their teleology is described in parables
of exchange.
For the Virginians, unlike the Chicagoans, the market is
not a means, but an end. The market is self-validating, without
reference to efficiency as an exogenous value.'4 "[V]alues are
defined only in the process itself.... In this sense, and in this
sense only, can the order generated in the economic market
process be labelled or classified as 'efficient.""' 5  Recognizing
the difficulty of constructing an independent and neutral set of
criteria to identify efficient outcomes, Buchanan simply aban-
dons the attempt to reach an end-state definition of efficiency
and identifies efficiency with the market process itself: "[Tihe
trading outcome must always be 'efficient,' and there is no way
the economist can define an 'efficient' allocation independently
of trade itself."6
Voluntary exchange is the only yardstick of efficiency, for
efficiency is not an independent concept, but itself a shorthand
for the achievement of individual preferences.' Exchange
would not occur if it did not serve the perceived self-interest of
individuals. The existence of voluntary exchange is the only
necessary evidence of efficiency. "The efficient solution [can be]
depended on to emerge from the interaction between the parties
in each interdependence."' 8 Absent coercion, we are assumed
to get what we want and want what we get.
In the marketplace, only efficient transactions occur; each
party agrees only to those exchanges that she perceives to be
personally beneficial. That is to say, parties agree only to
exchanges that provide mutual gains. In the perfect market-
place, trade takes place until the point of equilibrium, that is
the point when no surplus remains and no further transactions
14 JAMES M. BUcHANAN, Notes on Politics as Process, in LIBERTY, MARKET
AND STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 1980S, at 87, 87-88 (1986).
I5 Id. at 88.
16 GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMEs M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES 25
(1985).
1
,See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Order Defined in the Process of its Emergence,
in LIBERTY, MARKET AND STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 1980s, supra
note 14, at 73.
" Buchanan, supra note 7, at 443.
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can increase the welfare of one person without decreasing the
welfare of another. To the extent the market functions in this
way, it is cooperatively self-executing, and thus neutral. Such
a perfect market not only maximizes individual satisfaction, and
is thus efficient, but also places no constraints on the will of
individuals, and is thus fair.'9
Public choice theorists contend that desirable outcomes can
be reached by no means other than voluntary exchange between
individuals, ° and there are no social interests independent of
those of individuals. Buchanan claims that individual prefer-
ence is the only guide to the common interest of society; agree-
ments between individuals are the only possible evidence of
individual preference.2 '
The agreements that are the basis of exchanges in the
economic marketplace are voluntary, while government action is
coercive. In essence, voluntary decisions are individual, coercive
decisions majoritarian. But, if a political world could be fash-
ioned in which collective decisions were unanimous - the sum
of every individual's volition - then law constructed as the total
of all individual decisions could be freed, as it were, from poli-
tics. Buchanan's public choice theory looks to the market for a
model of law innocent of politics. Thus, his meta-project is to
derive public law entirely from private law, and subsume all law
under the category of contract.22
" James M. Buchanan, Good Economics - Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483,
486 (1974). As one would expect from a theory based upon individualism, the
maximum possible expression of individual will forms the ethical basis of the
theory.
2 Buchanan makes an exception to deal with "the public goods dilemma."
Buchanan, supra note 7, at 444; see also, BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 39. In
fact, that exception destabilizes his theoretical posture. See infra text accom-
panying notes 72-82, 104-07.
21 These differing individual preferences are exogenous to the exchange
process and are brought to it by market participants independent of the
process by which the exchanges take place. The ways in which desires are
formed is no part of Buchanan's public choice theory. The failure to allow or
account for endogenous preference-formation is a key element of some cri-
tiques of public choice theory. See, e.g., Jon Elster, The Market and the
Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
CHOICE THEORY 103 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
' In this sense, Buchanan's work could be described as an inversion of the
early twentieth century Realist project which attempted to break down the
distinction between public law and private law and subsume both under the
heading of public law. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 206-08.
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B. THE PARABLES OF THE STATE AS MARKET
Buchanan uses his parables of exchange to provide both the
normative basis of public law and a descriptive account of
politics. In its descriptive mode, public choice theory "takes the
tools and methods of approach ... in economic theory and
applies [them] to the political or governmental sector, to politics,
[and] to the public economy."' The two basic assumptions of
a public choice theorist in respect to the political world are,
first, that the "economists' utility-maximizing framework [ex-
tends] to the behavior of persons in various public-choosing roles
... [and second, that] the political process and the market
process are analogous.'
As in economic theory, a fundamental predicate of public
choice theory is a reductionist definition of humanity as a
congeries of discrete self-interested rational individuals who
interact with each other on the basis of voluntary exchange."
The model of Homo economicus "is the most appropriate one for
constitutional analysis."26  While it is used by economists to
explain market behavior, Homo economicus, the self-interested
rational individual, should not be abandoned "in nonmarket
settings, without any coherent explanation of how such a behav-
ioral shift [from self-interest to other-regardingness] comes
about."
27
The other predicate of public choice, a corollary to the first,
is the similarity of state and market. In Buchanan's contract-
23 JAMEs M. BUCHANAN, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive
Public Choice Theory and its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF
PUBLIC CHOICE - II, at 11, 13 (James M. Buchanan & Robert Tollison eds.,
1984).
' BUCHANAN, supra note 14, at 87.
2 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Public Choice Perspective, in ESSAYS ON THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY 13, 21-22 (1989).
26 BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 48; see infra text accompany-
ing notes 44-52.
27 Id. at 50. Economists concede such a model may not be veridical, see,
e.g., GEORGE STIGLER, The Economist as Preacher, in II TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 174-77 (1981), but is used to generate "as if' hypotheses.
Thus the fact that economists use the model is a weak reason for extending it
to nonmarket behavior, unless there is some pre-existing reason to model
politics as a market. The "politics as market" model rests on the assumption
that participants are self-interested, rational individuals, much like homo
economicus. The argument is thus circular.
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arian theories of political economy, there are two separate
analogies of state and market. First, in the benign sense, the
democratic state and the marketplace are subsets of one catego-
ry: social institutions that serve to aggregate individual prefer-
ences. "[T]he market and the State are both devices through
which co-operation is organized and made possible. ' 28  But
between these two devices, the market is preferred because
"voluntary action will always be more desirable in the sense
that it cannot place any unwanted restrictions on use of proper-
ty.v2
9
The market-subordinate state exists interstitially to protect
the market and facilitate those exchanges the unrestricted
market cannot arrange, but in the manner the market would if
it could. This state represents the preferences of market parti-
cipants about how to protect, enhance, and improve market
functioning. These preferences are rewarded in market fashion,
by means of a series of exchanges in which "the result of 'trade'
among persons will be a set of agreed-on rules rather than a
well-defined imputation of goods among separate indi-
viduals."' Such a state is a necessary adjunct to the market,
for it may act where the market fails.3'
In the second analogy of the state and market, the state is
conceived of as a market where goods that are unavailable in
the economic marketplace may be purchased in the majoritarian
legislature in exchange for votes, money, influence, or future
employment, inter alia. These goods are sold by self-interested
political actors who are willing to supply political outcomes to
buyers, at a price. It is in this sense that "[t]he constitutional-
ist-contractarian," says Buchanan, "interprets the political
process as a generalization of the market."2  The state is a
market where private interests obtain goods unavailable in the
economic market.
JAiYms M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
19 (1962).
21 Id., supra note 28, at 56.
30 BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 25.
" Buchanan himself does not use the term "market failure," but adopts its
essence, that is, that there are public goods achievable only through state
coercion. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
32 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Sources of Opposition to Constitutional Reform, in
LIBERTY, MARKET AND STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 1980S, supra note
14, at 55, 65.
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The goods in which the political market deals are redistri-
butive policies achieved by coercion. They are illegitimate
because they are unobtainable either in the economic market-
place or by voluntary agreement of market participants. These
politically-obtained redistributive and unproductive outcomes
are known as rents. While rents cannot be attained in a
well-functioning economic market, they are available in the
political marketplace at the expense of either the public or a
less effective interest group. 4 For example, grain farmers
might go to the political marketplace to purchase the right to
prohibit their neighbors' cattle-raising. They could purchase the
creation of such a right - by means of a statute - even in
those cases where ranching created more value than farming or
the farmers could not have afforded to purchase the right
privately.
Within this second analogy of state and market, "public
choice offers a 'theory of government failure,"' parallel to the
theory of market failure. In this sense, the parable of state as
market delegitimates majoritarian politics. As an acute com-
mentator points out, public choice theory reverses the old
presumptions that there is "something in the nature of market
organization... that brings out selfish motives ... and some-
thing in the political organization... which in turn suppresses
Rent is the difference in value between the best use of property and the
next best use. There are two kinds of rents. On one hand, redistribution from
minority to majority may be a rent if more is spent to achieve the outcome
than is realized. On the other hand, rents are achieved by groups too small to
represent a majority of voters. Public choice theory is based on the Olsonian
notion that small groups are in fact more likely to be effective in the govern-
mental arena than large ones. Because of the difficulty of organizing large
groups of people whose interests may be varied, information limited, and
demands diffuse, the mere fact that large groups can be widely benefitted or
broadly hurt by a measure is not enough to predict whether a measure will
succeed or fail. Small groups with a clear agenda and the ability to police
their members have the advantage in securing their ends through the process
of political exchanges. They succeed because they are small and single-
minded. Even in a democracy, producers (who are few), rather than consum-
ers (who are many), usually prevail. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-65 (1965). Thus,
there are two redistributive dangers that majoritarian democracy poses. On
one hand, an intense minority can overcome the less-interested majority; on
the other hand, majorities may similarly achieve redistributive outcomes.
'4 GORDON TIULLOCK, THE ECONOMICs OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT
SEEKING 55 (1989).
BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 11.
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these motives.""5  The process of exchange in the economic
market enhances social welfare; in the political market, it
diminishes it.
There is one further point to be made in describing the
nature of the legislative process in a majoritarian voting regime.
According to public choice theory, no legislative outcome ex-
presses the will of the majority because no majoritarian voting
regime based on some widely-accepted principles of democracy
can produce coherent, consistent, or stable outcomes. As
Buchanan puts it, "collectivities in which individual preferences
differ cannot.., make up their collective or group mind.
37
This conclusion is based on Arrow's Theorem, a mathemati-
cal proof of the proposition that majoritarian voting is not a
rational means to aggregate individual preferences." For a
democratically-made, non-unanimous decision that has more
than two possible outcomes, majorities for every outcome are
simultaneously possible. For example, even though voters may
prefer spending more money to the status quo and the status
quo to spending less money, they may prefer spending less
money to spending more money.39 The majority outcome cycles
among possible results unless outside political factors, such as
agenda control and voting rules, are brought to bear.4" Those
" Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 PUB. INTEREST 80,
85 (1987).
3 BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 17.
38 For a good introduction to Arrow's Theorem for the non-mathematician,
see ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE
(1980).
'9 The linear arrangement suggested here - more money, the same
amount, less money - provides a partial answer to the problem of cycling. If
preferences can be arranged linearly and the community of potential voters
agree, not on their preferences, but on the transitive arrangement (such that
those who prefer more spending prefer no change to less spending and vice
versa), then a definite and unique majority position can be produced at the
median position, in this case, no change in spending. See DUNCAN BLACK, On
the Rationale of Group Decision Making, in 12 READINGS IN WELFARE ECO-
NOMICS 133, 141 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Tibor Scitovsky eds., 1969). Of course,
if individual voters have different preferences within the spending question,
for example, some who wish to spend more on education prefer to spend less
on prisons, while others do not, it is harder to avoid cycling. It is in such
circumstances that coalitions and log-rolling emerge.
4 0 Another answer to the problem of the incoherence of democratic majori-
ties could be provided were it possible for voters to express not merely their
ordinary preferences, but the intensity of preference that they experience as to
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outside factors are exogenous to majoritarian voting though not
to the political process itself. Given Arrow's Theorem, it is
incoherent to justify the majoritarian state on the basis that it
is a necessary corrector of market failures caused by the aggre-
gation of individual preferences." Even those tasks which the
market cannot do better, the majoritarian legislature cannot do
coherently or stably. It can arrive at a decision about how to
correct market failures, but that decision will not represent a
defensible aggregation of a majority of individual preferences.
Considering the state as a market for illegitimate goods,
obtained by coercive and unstable majoritarianism in the service
of aggressive minorities, Buchanan concludes that legislative
unanimity is the only prescription that can ensure the probity
and coherence of a democratic voting regime. "The unanimity
rule must occupy [the central place] in any normative theory of
democratic government."'2 Only under a unanimity regime is
"collective or governmental decision making ... equivalent to
freely negotiated voluntary exchange."'3
II. THE ORIGIN OF PROPERTY AND STATE
A. THE INDIVDUAL AND THE CREATION OF THE STATE
Contractarian political theory begins with individualism
and uses a set of assumptions about the self-interested, rational,
and conflicting character of individuals to draw conclusions
about the creation and continued functioning of collective choice
mechanisms like the market and the state.
1. The Non-Communitarian Account of the State
Buchanan's account of the creation of the state is more
Hobbesian than Rousseauian: the state does not express a
the desirability of each potential outcome. But our inability to measure inter-
subjective intensity of preference is precisely what leads us to posit homo
economicus, whose preferences can be measured objectively in cardinal dollars.
" Buchanan describes the shift from a sort of simple-minded pragmatism
which accepted the usefulness of any government program, to the more
rigorous, market-oriented view of government failure as being centrally
assisted by the proof of Arrow's Theorem. BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 172.
42 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 96.
SJAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State,
in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE - II, supra note 23, at 159, 163.
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general will, but merely aggregates the preferences of individu-
als." The "state cannot be conceived as some community
embodiment of abstract ideals, which take form over and beyond
the attainment of individuals. "45 There is "no 'public interest'
as such in a society of freely choosing individuals.
46
Buchanan's version of public choice theory asserts that
community has no independent value: "We live together be-
cause social organization provides the efficient means of achiev-
ing our individual objectives and not because society offers us a
means of arriving at some transcendental common bliss."'7
The values of community simply do not exist for the rational
self-interested individual: "[A]ny person's ideal situation is one
that allows him full freedom of action and inhibits the behavior
of others so as to force adherence to his own desires. That is to
say, each person seeks mastery over a world of slaves."' But
this is a "utopian dream."'9 To the extent that the state is fair
or just, it is not the ideals of the community that make it so, but
rather the individuals, who demand a neutral umpire in the
inevitable struggles for mastery among themselves. °
"Buchanan's version of the initial contract is not Hobbesian, but Lockean,
in the sense that the sovereign created by the contractors has no rights
independent of them. Id. at 162.
" BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 68.
46 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, An Individualistic Theory of Political Process, in
EcoNoMIcs: BETWEEN PREDICTIVE SCIENCE AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 223,226
(1987).
4' BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 1.
48 Id. at 92.
49 Id.
" Indeed, the pursuit of the common good may well have brought the
nation to its current sad state: "Those who have promoted the extension of
government's role under the folly that some national interest exists have,
perhaps unwittingly, aided in the breakdown of effective moral order." JAMES
M. BUCHANAN, Moral Community, Moral Order and Moral Anarchy, in
LIBERTY, MARKET AND STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 1980S, supra note
14, at 108, 117 [hereinafter BUCHANAN, Moral Community]. The idea of"some
transcendent 'public good" is part of the "socialist mystique [that]... is with
us yet, in many guises." BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 12.
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There is no social predicate to the creation of the state. The
individual recognizes the need for the state only because he sees
in others the same self-interest he finds in himself:5'
When he recognizes that there are limits to the other-
regardingness of men, and that personal conflict would
be ubiquitous in anarchy, the extreme individualist is
forced to acknowledge the necessity of some enforcing
agent, some institutionalized means of resolving inter-
personal disputes. The origins of the state can be
derived from an individualistic calculus.52
2. The Natural Distribution and the Creation of the
Market
The "anarchy" to which Buchanan refers is the horrid
Hobbesian state of war, each person against all, with predation
and defense necessarily claiming everyone's att6ntion. Pre-
politically, individuals possess goods and .wealth but can protect
these possessions only by force. They must always be aware of
both the need for protection and the opportunities for predation.
They must invest resources in both activities: each individual
must protect her own goods and wealth and seize her neigh-
bor's. The "natural distribution" of property is "secured upon
investment of effort in attack and/or defense .... , This
initial distribution is neither a political nor a legal question,'
51 There are virtually no examples of Buchanan's uses of non-gendered
language and the female pronoun. I do recall, however, coming across a single
exception in a reference to the constitutional moment, when contractors are
supposedly in the original position and thus unaware of their gender, inter
alia. In the course of that single sentence, Buchanan, apparently consciously,
switches from use of the male pronoun, to use of both male and female
pronouns, and then back. Apparently, the dominance of the male gender is
established immediately upon the close of that moment. This seems a peculiar
notion for a theory that stresses the individual above all else.
52 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 6 (citation omitted).
s Id. at 24. Buchanan attributes to Winston Bush the term "natural
distribution" to describe the pre-contract state of predation and defense. Id.
at 58.
' See BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 23 (stating that there are "no property
rights, no law," in the initial distribution). Buchanan says that he does not
examine closely the means by which the initial distribution of property occurs
because the analysis of the original division "would carry us too far afield."
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 47 n.3. He claims to "jump over'...
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and "[emerges] from actual or potential conflict."55 This pro-
cess necessarily occurs before the state can be constituted.
Until the "natural distribution" is established, by means of
occupancy and predation, "it is difficult even to discuss the
problems of individual constitutional choice .... "5
Once the initial distribution has taken place, individual
self-interest begins to indicate the need for a state. Beyond
predation, opportunities exist for mutual gains from trade
among individuals. However, to facilitate potential trades for
mutual gain, property must be secure and exchanges between
individuals enforceable. Absent such security, predation is a
rational practice. Moreover, informal agreements alone will not
suffice to promote trades for mutual gain. It is rational to
defect from such agreements as long as no enforceable penalties
attach to defection. The inability to engage fully in voluntary
exchanges prior to a constitutional contract is a form of the
prisoner's dilemma, in which the individual's rational pursuit of
her self-interest leads to larger-scale irrationalities.
Predator-defenders, all rational, come to recognize that
collective action could limit the "external costs that the private
actions of other individuals impose . . . .""' Thus, rationality
dictates the creation of a mechanism to enforce the right to
exclude, to reduce the costs of both further predation and
defense against predation. Joint state-creating action, in the
form of a constitutional contract, provides each individual with
"external benefits that cannot be secured through purely private
behavior.""8
Buchanan's state thus functions to protect, rather than
create, property. It comes into being to facilitate exchanges.
States are "merely extensions of [preexisting] markets . . .,,"
Possession of wealth predates the original contract which
the initial definition of human and property rights." Id. at 46.
" BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 28.
56 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 46.
" Id. at 43. These costs are "external" to the individual's own behavior.
Id. at 44. The individual incurs "decision-making costs" in attempting to
eliminate "external costs," and the authors call the sum of the two "interde-
pendence costs." Id. at 46.
5 Id. at 43-44.
59 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, What Should Economists Do?, in ECONOMICS:
BETWEEN PREDICTIVE SCIENCE AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 21,
29.
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creates the state, but the right to be protected in possession
cannot be said to exist until a protective force external to
individuals is created. That protective force is born when
individuals recognize that predation and defense may cost more
than agreeing on collective action to eliminate them.60 After
such agreement, "'law' of a sort has.., emerged." 1
B. CONSTITUTING THE STATE
The creation of the state is a two-step process." First, a
judicial state appears and then a legislative function is
added.
1. The Judicial State
In Buchanan's account, the initial form of law is "the
mutual acceptance of some disarmament,"'' accompanied by
some form of enforcement to discourage what would otherwise
be rational defection from the agreements of one's fellows. In
its ur-form, then, the state is the neutral enforcer of rules of
non-aggression agreed to by the parties. Buchanan calls this
the "judicial" state, or state as referee. This state is fair or just
in the sense that referees may be, that is, it enforces the rules
to which the players have agreed ante hoc.65 It is non-coercive
in the sense that each contractor has agreed specifically to abide
0 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 48-49.
61 Id. at 59. The disarmament agreement is not necessarily a "stand-in-
place" agreement but may be accompanied by redistribution of goods to obtain
the agreement of all. Id. at 63-64.
62 Buchanan does not claim that his account of the creation of the state is
historically valid. Rather he claims to be seeking a post hoc rationalization.
He believes that this will allow the contractarian to concede the legitimacy of
the state and at the same time provide the outline for its "constructive
constitutional reform." BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 22.
' There is some difference between BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28,
and BUCHANAN, supra note 10, in this respect. In the latter, Buchanan is
more willing to see the initial contract as an integral one which creates
allocative and redistributive functions simultaneously. BUCHANAN, supra note
10, at 72-73. This is because obtaining the agreement of all to such a contract
may require distributional concessions. Nonetheless, he continues to recognize
that the two are separate, and I follow that lead. See id. at 28-30, 51.
" BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 59.
65 Id. at 68.
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by rules and if a contractor breaks a rule, she has agreed to be
sanctioned.66
In a referee state, courts exist and legislatures do not.
There is no room for legislation, either direct or, as in judicial
law-making, indirect. Courts apply pre-existing constitutional
rules to facts mechanically. This formalist notion limits the
judicial function to fact-finding:
[The judge] makes no "choices" in the strict meaning of
this term .... The participants agree on a structure of
individual rights or claims that is to be enforced, and
violation requires only the findings of fact and the
automatic administration of sanctions. A contract or
right is or is not violated; this is the determination to
be made by "the law" .... Properly interpreted, "the
law" which is enforced is that which is specified to be
enforced in the initial contract, whatever this might
be.
67
The judge's task is "purely scientific"68 and involves no element
of choice. Judicial decisions are noncoercive factual determina-
tions that simply give effect to contracts entered voluntarily.
The law - the common law - works neutrally to facilitate
voluntary and private interactions. The purpose for which the
judicial state exists is simple: it "provide[s] the basis upon
which individuals can initiate and implement trades and ex-
changes .... "69
The story might end here. "This state is law embodied, and
its role is one of enforcing rights to property, to exchanges of
property, and of policing the simple and complex exchange
6 See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 103 ("Tacit consent can be
construed to be given to rules of a game by participants when they voluntarily
participate.")
67 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 69. By 1985, Buchanan, with his collabo-
rator, Geoffrey Brennan, developed a somewhat more sophisticated perspective
on the judiciary and conceded that "judicial interpretation may, in some cases,
amount to a change in the rules and, in this sense, raise the issue of what role
the courts properly exercise in the whole institutional order." BUCHANAN,
supra note 16, at 109.
' BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 95, 104. Limiting the judicial function as
to fact-finding conflates the role of judge and jury.
69 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 50.
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processes among contracting free men.""° Individuals have
secured not only protection of their rights to exclude others from
their possessions, but protection of their rights to trade their
possessions. These rights can be enforced by appeal to a body
that maintains order. Doubtful cases can be resolved by a body
that resolves disputes. Thus, "there is no need for 'governing' as
such."71
2. The Legislative State
The judicial state would suffice but for the fact that rational
outcomes cannot always be achieved simply by virtue of the
rational acts of individuals. The development of the legislative
state is necessary because there are potential gains from trade
in public goods that cannot be realized without coercion. Indi-
viduals agree to such coercion because these gains will not be
achieved spontaneously. 2 Such gains are unrealized due to
the market's inability to produce public goods.
Public goods are nonpartitionable interdependen-
cies - goods from which all benefit and none can be excluded.
They will not be produced by self-interested individuals because
of problems of monopolies, hold-outs, free-riders, imperfect
information and high transaction costs. In consequence, some
voluntary exchanges, and their accompanying gains, will not be
realized in the judicial state. Voluntary exchange can produce
public bads and generalized externalities, such as environmen-
tal degradation, from which all suffer but whose creation is a
private good.
The realization of public goods is only possible with coer-
cion." Coercive legislation can reach solutions which the
voluntary market cannot because coercion can eliminate strate-
gic behavior like free-riding, refusing to pay one's share for the
provision of public goods. According the state a legislative func-
tion signifies the agreement of individuals to be bound by the
aggregation of individual preferences in order to realize mutual
gains that the unaided market cannot achieve.74 The individu-
als agree to submit to particular future decisions, which they
70 1d. at 163.
7 BUCHANAN, Moral Community, supra note 50, at 111.
72 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 37.
73 For this account, see BUCHANAN & TULLoOK, supra note 28, at 43-84.
" BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 42-43.
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themselves might oppose, as a means of achieving a variety of
outcomes not otherwise ensured that will, on the whole, be
beneficial.
The legislative state will not always function neutrally. It
"must include departures from any rules that would be fully
analogous to voluntary exchanges." 5 It may impose outcomes
that are not beneficial to all. "[T]he essence of the collective-
choice process under majority voting rules is the fact that the
minority of voters are forced to accede to actions which they
cannot prevent and for which they cannot claim compensation
for damages resulting." 6  This makes possible "politics for
predation."7 Thus does the serpent enter Eden.
C. ESTABLISHING THE UNANIMITY RULE
Buchanan seeks to scotch the serpent by creating an ac-
count in which coercion and volition are compatible. He at-
tempts to square coercion and unanimity. His answer is to
postulate a state whose coercive power is brought to bear only
to achieve the results the market would achieve non-coercively
were it not for strategic behavior.
1. Unanimity and Coercion
Individual volition is uniquely lodged in a rule of unanimity
and Buchanan is thus actively hostile to legislative majoritar-
ianism. The insistence on majority rule in western democracies
represents an inversion - "majority rule has been elevated to
the status which the unanimity rule should occupy."" Under
majoritarian voting rules, the state as conceived by the contract-
ors' agreement - a turn to collective action for external bene-
fits - may become the state as marketplace for coercive redis-
tribution. Only under the unanimity rule are we assured "that
all external effects will be eliminated by collectivization.
7 9
Only unanimity in legislative decision-making can ensure that
the state functions on the same basis of voluntary exchange that
characterizes the market and ensure that the state does not
75 Id. at 100.
76 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 89-90.
" BUCHANAN, supra note 14, at 90.
78 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 96.
79 Id. at 89.
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impose burdens on individuals which they would not themselves
choose to carry."0
But Buchanan recognizes that even voluntary ex-
change - the marketplace - cannot exist without coercion.
Strategic behavior will, in the absence of coercion, always
dictate defection from agreements where the contracting parties
are unequal in power. To create a market, a place where all
agreements are voluntary, market participants must agree to be
coerced. Voluntary exchange in the marketplace was impossible
until the pre-contract predator/defenders agreed to bind them-
selves to coercion. That agreement created the state. Thus,
although the market mechanism relies on unanimity, it is
created by coercion.
Coercion is requisite to the existence of the voluntary
marketplace. Such is the paradox of the market. But once the
coercive mechanism is created, it may be used to attain ends
other than those to which market participants would voluntarily
agree. Such is the dilemma of the state. It is Buchanan's
project to give us an account of a state that is both coercive and
unanimous. He does so by concluding that the original contrac-
tors, in agreeing to form the state, in effect agreed that unanim-
ity was so important it could be coerced.
Consider an example of coerced unanimity. Assume that it
is in the interest of everyone to have a fire department. Any
single individual is better off letting her neighbors pay for fire
equipment and free-riding on the services they provide. If
voluntary exchanges in the market are the only means by which
such nonpartitionable interdependencies can be provided, she
will allow her neighbors to purchase the services that cannot be
denied to her.
But collective coercion is an alternative. Her neighbors may
threaten to exclude her from the community if she fails to
contribute a proportionate share to the provision of the services
from which she benefits. She has chosen to enter the com-
munity on the basis of self-interest, to enjoy protection of her
ownership of property and her participation in the market.
Therefore, she will recognize her. interest in joining a unani-
mous scheme to provide the service and distribute the cost
o Buchanan attributes this insight to Knut Wicksell, a German scholar
whom Buchanan himself rediscovered as a student in the late forties.
BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 38; see also, JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Better than
Plowing, in ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 67, 72
[hereinafter BUCHANAN, Better than Plowing].
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equitably, rather than risk her neighbors excluding her from the
community and negating her ownership claims.81 Fire services
will be supplied to everyone at a cost everyone is willing to pay.
Thus a solution which makes everyone better off can be reached
by collective action where it could not be reached in the market-
place.
If the benefit the individual derives from the coerced
decision exceeds its cost to her, then coercing her contribution
does not amount to non-unanimity. She would have voluntarily
undertaken an equivalent exchange in the economic market-
place if that were the only means to acquire the good. While
she might prefer to get fire services free, she still benefits from
their social provision at a cost of ten dollars, if the market
alternative were to pay fifty dollars for their individual
provision. So long as the cost of the benefit in the market
exceeds its cost socially provided, legislatively-coerced payment
for benefits simply eliminates the alternative to payment that
strategic behavior - holding out on payment and free-riding on
the payments by one's neighbors - represents. Assuming
previous consent to coercion, some cost-imposing legislative
decisions can be made unanimously.82
2. Coerced Unanimity and Legislation
Buchanan uses Miller v. Schoene,83 a case upholding a
legislative decision that cedar trees carrying disease to apple
trees could be destroyed without compensation to their owners,
as the starting point for a discussion of how coercive legislative
power can legitimately be used to achieve unanimity."
According to Buchanan, that decision amounted to a
legislatively-ordered taking of the value of the cedar trees. He
would have preferred a legislative mandate that the apple tree
81 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 41.
82 Consenting to coercion is of course a tricky proposition; Buchanan
suggests that consent is freely given when the alternative is expulsion from
the community accompanied by confiscation of wealth. BUCHANAN, supra note
10, at 39. Few practicing lawyers would fail to argue that their clients who
"consented" in such circumstances could not be held to the agreement.
Nonetheless, the necessity to accord the state a coercive role requires this
strained reading of consent.
8 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
' See Buchanan, supra note 7.
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owners purchase from cedar tree owners the right to be disease-
free, a purchase that would benefit both parties.
Although Buchanan assumes that the apple tree owners
had no pre-existing property right to eliminate. diseased cedar
trees, he does not argue that such a-property regime could not
have justifiably existed. Instead, he says, given that an existing
structure of rights presumably gave cedar tree owners the right
to continue to grow diseased trees, an opportunity for mutual
gains from trade existed. Apple tree owners could have paid
cedar tree owners to destroy cedar trees. The price would have
reflected the apple tree owners' estimate of the worth of their
crop and the cedar tree owners' estimate of the worth of their
trees. Assuming the former estimate greater than the latter, a
deal could have been made voluntarily.
Legislation would be justifiable only if strategic behavior
made it impossible for the apple tree and cedar tree owners to
strike a fair bargain themselves. Suppose, for example, the
cedar tree owners took advantage of their monopoly position in
negotiation with apple tree owners and overstated the value of
their trees, refusing to negotiate a lower price. In such a case,
the legislature could justifiably order a forced sale equivalent to
an eminent domain purchase. If, however, the cedar tree
owners set a realistic price, but one higher than the total value
of the apple crop, the legislature should not act to protect the
apple tree owners. In such a case, the market result would be
that the apple trees would be allowed to die of cedar-borne
disease. The legislature would have no reason to order a sale
that would not occur in the marketplace.
Legislatively-mandated transactions also make it possible to
eliminate free-riding, another form of strategic behavior.
Suppose an apple tree owner refused to join her fellows in
bargaining with cedar tree owners. If her fellows reached an
arrangement which provided for the destruction of diseased
cedar trees, she could not be excluded from the benefits of their
actions, though the others would have to incur higher costs than
if she participated. Or suppose the apple tree owners reached
agreement with all but one cedar tree owner, who could then
hold out for a higher price than his fellows had received for
their diseased trees, or receive a side-payment from them in
order to close the deal. In such cases, the legislature could
intervene to order, through compensated transfer, an exchange
the parties would have reached themselves, sans these free-
rider and hold-out problems. The legislature could coerce the
1993]
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participation of all apple tree owners and all cedar tree owners
in an exchange of money for performance.
A market result is achieved if all apple tree owners are
willing to offer an amount equal to what all cedar tree owners
would voluntarily accept.85 Legislatively-mandated compensa-
tion duplicates the payment necessary to secure an exchange in
the economic marketplace and eliminates the strategic behavior
that can stymie the market result. Although the product of
coercive legislation, such compensation would make both parties
better off than they were before, since each side would receive
the benefits it would have obtained in a market transaction.
In essence, then, the role of the state, according to Buchan-
an, is to enable transactions the market would achieve if it
could. The state's coercive force is to be used only to bring those
transactions about, not to obviate the need for them. The
transactions involve trading consent for compensation; no one
ever suffers a net loss by virtue of government action, for no
uncompensated transfer ever takes place. Even though the
state is coercive, it reaches results that are universally accept-
able. The representatives of apple and cedar tree owners agree
to coerce their constituents to accept an outcome that benefits
all constituents, even though hold-outs and free-riders derive
less than they would if they were not coerced to abandon their
strategic behavior. Thus unanimous outcomes are achieved by
coercion. Such a state is the market writ large, and nothing
more.
III. THE CRITIQUE
I will now offer a critique derived solely from an examina-
tion of the structure on its own terms. I begin with a discussion
of Buchanan's account of the creation of the state and move to
a discussion of the unanimity requirement.
A. THE DILEMMA OF THE ORIGINAL POSITION
A key objection to the Buchananite project is its inability to
give a normatively defensible account of the pre-political distri-
bution. The lack of normative defensibility is a failing because
of the weight that necessarily attaches to the initial distribution
by the requirement that any subsequent change be unanimous.
Id. at 447-48.
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The unanimity requirement, and thus the initial distribution, is
institutionalized through the constitutional agreement among
those who have obtained goods in the state of nature, the
constitutional agreement which creates the rules that must be
followed in the creation of all other rules. In other words, those
who have property, expost that distribution, may constitutional-
ly require unanimity for any change in the status quo. Buchan-
an claims that the unanimity requirement is ex ante the state
because the constitutional contract, which embeds unanimity,
forms the state. But the initial contract is not ex ante the
distribution of goods and wealth, nor is itoex ante the market.
The Buchananite constitution is a contract among individu-
als to protect the property they have already obtained86 as a
result of an "initial definition of human and property rights."8
This contract represents a decision of property-holders that
there is benefit in "reductions in predation-defense effort.""8
Thus, any uncertainty with which Buchananite contractors are
confronted at the constitutional moment does not involve their
current status, but their "precise role[s] in any one of the whole
chain of later collective choices that will actually have to be
made."89 To use Buchanan's metaphor, the contractors are not
uncertain about the game, but about the plays.90
8 8James M. Buchanan, The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism, in
LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 9, 10-
12 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990).
87 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 50.
' BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 28.
89 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 78.
90 Id. at 79-80, 261.
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-The Buchananite contract is therefore non-Rawlsian.9'
This is a serious flaw, for Buchanan himself recognizes that
Rawlsianism is important to his project.
Rawlsianism represents a possible major justification
for the whole "constitutionalist" [contractarian]
approach. If individuals are totally ignorant as to their
future positions, they have no separately identifiable
interests; there is a fundamental equality of position.
It seems impossible that agreements reached in such a
context could reflect unacceptable differences in status
quo positions.92
But, the Buchananite contract is made after the parties have
gained what Buchanan calls the "individual power of disposition
over human and nonhuman resources."" Indeed, says
Buchanan, "[u]nless this preliminary step is taken, we do not
really know what individuals we are discussing."94 However,
once this preliminary step is taken and we "know what individ-
uals we are discussing," they know far more than contractors in
the Rawlsian "original position." Thus, although Buchanan at
various points claims the Rawlsian mantle for his version of the
pre-political contract,95 that is inaccurate. Unlike Rawls,
Buchanan conflates his contractors' ignorance of their future
with ignorance of their present.96
91 JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), attempts a liberal contract-
arian account of the creation of a just society. The contract is made by
individuals in what he calls the "original position of equality," id. at 12, aware
of their individuality but not of their individual traits. Hence, the rules they
select to govern society are free of narrow self-interest. Id. A social contract
not arrived at from the original position will embody the preferences of its
witting framers and is thus non-Rawlsian. For a good discussion of Rawls, see
Stephen M. Griffin, Reconstructing Rawls' Theory of Justice: Developing a
Public Values Philosophy of the Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 715 (1987).
92 BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 107.
93 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 47.
94 Id. at 47.
95 BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 30-31; BUCHANAN, supra note
12, at 35.
' See, e.g., BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 107.
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I am not claiming that inequality of persons alone defeats
Rawlsianism among Buchanan's contractors.97 Rawls himself
recognizes inherent inequality:
[W]e may reject the contention that the ordering of
institutions is always defective because the distribution
of natural talents and the contingencies of social cir-
cumstance are unjust, and this injustice must inevita-
bly carry over to human arrangements.... [This] is
neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are
born into society at some particular position. These are
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the
way that institutions deal with these facts.9"
The Rawlsian argument for assigning rights from the "original
position - the position of the uncharacterized individual with-
out status, gender, property, physical, or mental attributes - is
precisely that any other account of pre-political contract risks
institutionalizing the status quo:
What is lacking [in other accounts] is a suitable defini-
tion of the status quo that is acceptable from a moral
point of view. We cannot take various contingencies as
known and individual preferences as given and expect
to elucidate the concept of justice (or fairness) by theo-
ries of bargaining. The conception of the original posi-
tion is designed to meet the problem of the appropriate
status quo.99
The Rawlsian contract is made from behind the famous "veil of
ignorance." No parties to the contract know either their current
or their post-contract position.
By contrast, the Buchananite constitution is made by
witting individuals who contract in order to preserve the posi-
tions they have obtained pre-contract. Institutions constitution-
9 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 54 (Buchanan explicitly modifies his earlier
assumptions in BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, by assuming personal
inequalities. He claims that "the unsupported presumption of natural
equality" pre-contract introduces normative biases into the analysis of subse-
quent institutions.).
9 8 JoHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTicE 102 (1971).
9 Id. at 134-35 n.10.
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ally created to protect property enhance rather than diminish
the natural facts of inequality. Such a contract must, and
indeed is designed to, stabilize an existing situation. The
Buchananite contract institutionalizes a "natural distribution"
not normatively justifiable by its roots in occupancy and preda-
tion.
Perhaps in response to criticism that he institutionalizes
the status quo, Buchanan has given multiple accounts of the
creation of the state, which conflict as to whether property,
market, or state are prior. In his 1962 work, Calculus of Con-
sent, and again in his 1974 work, The Limits of Liberty,
Buchanan indicated that possession predated both market and
state. 100 Hence, the state-creating contract was the product of
the agreement of knowledgeable and identified individuals.
However, in a 1984 article, Buchanan wrote that "constitu-
tional order ... must precede any meaningful economic interac-
tion,"'' placing the state prior to the market. And, in 1985,
Buchanan and his collaborator, Geoffrey Brennan, argued even
more explicitly that "contractual agreement on rules must
precede any ordinary trading of partitionable goods .... Politi-
cal order must, therefore, be antecedent to economic order."'0 2
This position puts the state prior not only to the market, but
apparently to possession as well. This solves the problem of
institutionalizing a property regime based at best on occupancy
and at worst on predation. It creates, however, an even more
serious problem. Now the contract is made by individuals who
have no specific need for it, for they have neither possession to
protect, nor republican impulses to create a formal governing
mechanism.
While understandable, this shift leaves Buchanan in an odd
position. The market is normatively superior to the state
because the market requires voluntary exchange. And the state
is the creation of predator-defenders who organize to protect
their pre-existing holdings and facilitate market exchange. But
in order to conceive of this state as just in the Rawlsian sense,
Buchanan must postulate that the state precedes the market
100 See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 24 (Buchanan asserts that the
assumption of an initial distribution of property by means of "attack and/or
defense" is necessary, for without it, "there is simply no way of initiating
meaningful contracts, actually or conceptually.").
'01 BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 14.
102 BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 26.
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and creates it. This, it appears, is the consequence of an at-
tempt to escape from the bind of non-Rawlsianism which atta-
ches to a constitutional contract made ex post the initial distri-
bution.
But while placing the state prior to the market may satisfy
the Rawlsian model, it betrays the contractarian one, derived
from Hobbes, which imagines the creation of the state as the
response of self-interested individuals to the crisis of anarchy.
The contractarian account of the creation of the state rests upon
the contractors' recognition that collective action is needed to
correct the deficiencies attendant upon collectively-irrational
outcomes of individually-rational actions, i.e., predation and
defection. But without the initial distribution of goods, there
would have been no predation and defection and hence no
recognition of the need for collective action.' 3 If the contrac-
tors have no recognizable need for collective action, Buchanan
cannot tell us why they contract.
It seems that this is an inescapable dilemma. Either the
original contractors act from behind the Rawlsian veil of igno-
rance and thus have no Hobbesian need to contract because
they have no wealth to protect against each other, or they have
already distributed the wealth around them and are contracting
to protect it. The hypothetical contract then loses its moral
force as a justification for existing institutions and market
contractarianism collapses back into positivism. Hence,
Buchanan's inability to justify the initial distribution under-
mines his later insistence that the existing order can be
changed only by unanimous agreement.
B. THE CRITIQUE OF UNANIMITY
1. Normative Justifications of Unanimity
a. The Preservation of the Status Quo
In Buchanan's model of coerced unanimity, the status quo
cannot be changed without unanimous consent nb matter how
the status quo came to exist. Although there is no normative
character to the initial distribution and certainly no require-
ment that it be agreed to unanimously, Buchanan holds the
view that if "'efficiency' is acknowledged to be the desired
103 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 26.
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criterion... normative improvement in process is measured by
movement toward the unanimity requirement."'" Unanimity
as the test of good government amounts to a measure of how
well government protects the initial distribution." 5 Absent an
independent justification for such an agreement rule, it is
difficult to see why unanimity must be regarded as an ethical
principle, unless the relevant ethic is one of opposition to redis-
tribution.
Buchanan, who admits to a prejudice for the status quo,'
justifies his bias as a preference for voluntary agreement over
the imposition of public solutions. "[Oinly such a prejudice
offers incentives for the emergence of voluntarily negotiated
settlements among the parties themselves. Indirectly, therefore,
this prejudice guarantees that resort to the authority of the
State is effectively minimized.',
0 7
This rationale is puzzling. Protection of the status quo is
positive because it promotes market exchange and minimizes
government intervention. Governmental intervention is only
tolerated because on rare occasions the status quo may be
unsatisfactory and unanimity ineffective to change it. For
instance, voluntary agreements cannot eliminate hold-out and
free-rider problems, eventually making government intervention
necessary. It is the market's own unanimity requirement that
is at the root of the problem of supplying public goods and
preventing public bads, for the market cannot coerce free-riders
into participation in the payment of benefits they can receive
freely. Coercion, and the resulting possibility of non-unanimity,
is required because the status quo must change, and it must
change by means other than voluntary transactions. To say one
privileges the status quo because it favors voluntary agreements
104 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Constitution of Economic Policy, in ECONOM-
Ics: BETWEEN PREDICTIVE SCIENCE AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46,
at 303, 309.
105 This is not to say that first possession as the basis of property owner-
ship necessarily requires an independent normative underpinning. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979)
(first possession justifies title on a pragmatic and comparative, not a norma-
tive and absolute, basis). The normative analysis is introduced by insisting,
as Buchanan does, that subsequent to first possession, any change in entitle-
ments ought to be unanimous.
"00 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 452.
107 Id.
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simply does not respond to the question of what should be done
when voluntary exchange fails.
b. Unanimity and Democracy
Buchanan's chief claim for unanimity is a normative one
based upon democracy. 0 8 What, after all, is more democratic
than an action taken by unanimous consent? The requirement
of unanimity seems to answer the argument that the market
does not provide a good model for politics because the decisions
of an individual consumer cannot appropriately be imposed
upon others.0 9 By definition, unanimous decisions are not
imposed, but chosen. They are outcomes upon which all have
agreed.
In order to see the flaw in the democracy argument, one
must look not at what is done by unanimous consent, but at
what is not done when one voter frustrates unanimous consent.
Inaction and the preservation of the status quo may be the will
of one voter. Yet that voter will prevail regardless of the num-
ber of votes cast for action.
But does inaction amount to imposition of individual choice
upon others? To say that would lead to "the paradoxical result
that the rule of unanimity is the same as the minority rule of
one."11 According to Buchanan, "[i]t does not seem meaning-
ful to say that the power to block action constitutes effective
'rule.""'" He contends that there is a "difference between the
power to impose external costs on others and the power to
"o BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 151.
19 For example, Jon Elster says the theory:
[E]mbodies a confusion between the kind of behaviour that is
appropriate in the market place and that which is appropriate in
the forum. The notion of consumer sovereignty is acceptable
because, and to the extent that, the consumer chooses between
courses of action that differ only in the way they affect him. In
political choice situations, however, the citizen is asked to express
his preference over states that also differ in the-way in which they
affect other people.
Elster, supra note 21, at 111. Critics like Elster argue that it is inappropriate
to transfer the "consumer sovereignty" of the market into the forum. In the
market, the consumer's decisions affect only herself; in the political realm her
choices may be imposed on others. Id.
110 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 259 (emphasis deleted).
'Id. at 258.
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prevent external costs from being imposed.11 2 The suggested
difference is between preserving the status quo and changing it
by imposing costs.
However, preserving the status quo is not necessarily the
same as imposing no costs. Assume that eminent domain
proceedings require a unanimity rule. If a landowner refuses to
sell her land for flood control purposes, her neighbors must
either bear the flood costs or bear the flood abatement costs
sans her participation. The status quo remains with respect to
the recalcitrant landowner, whose costs are unchanged, but not
with respect to her neighbors. The landowner has preserved
her status quo precisely by imposing external costs on others.
Once again, strategic behavior overcomes the community's
ability to acquire public goods on a shared payment basis.
Just as the majority may impose costs upon the minority
where majority voting prevails, the single uncoerced voter may
impose costs upon all other voters where unanimity is the rule.
Indeed, the hold-out, whether voter or party to a private ex-
change, behaves rationally. The landowner may demand a
higher price for her property as an inducement for her vote, just
as the market participant in a monopoly position holds out for
a better price before closing a deal. In either case, a single
actor may impose her will by virtue of her ability to veto other-
wise unanimous outcomes.
c. Unanimity and Intensity of Preference
Buchanan also argues that unanimity is democratic because
it allows the expression of preference intensity, not just its mere
existence." 3 But, a unanimity regime only expresses intensity
of preference for the status quo. A unanimity rule, which
privileges opposition to change, cannot express the of opposition
to the status quo. Unanimity only recognizes those preferences
expressed as a negative, as a veto. Proponents' preferences go
unregistered unless unanimous, while the intensity of opposition
to change is accorded an undeniable voice.
The preference for unanimity over majority rule implicitly
assumes that redistribution is unacceptable. Allowing redistri-
bution only upon unanimous consent recognizes the preference
of the single opponent of redistribution and ignores the prefer-
.
12 Id. (emphasis deleted).
.. Buchanan, supra note 7, at 446.
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ences of its proponents. Redistribution is assumed to injure a
member of the minority more than it helps a member of the
majority."4 As a result, intensity of preference for redistribu-
tive change will not be measured, but intensity of preference
against will prevail.
The assumption that opponents' preference is necessarily
stronger than that of proponents may not be accurate. Imagine
a community of four voters. Three are wealthy and one is poor;
the poor voter's child requires medicine that only the other
three together can provide. The poor person persuades two of
her fellow-citizens to provide for the child, but not the third.
Under a unanimity rule, the child will die."' The intensity of
the third voter's preference not to suffer redistribution in order
to provide for the child has been expressed, but it can hardly be
said that the unanimity rule has accurately expressed the
intensity of preferences of all voters, including the mother.
Unanimity is a means by which the intensity of a minority's
oppositional preference for the status quo will be expressed, and
the potential intensity of the majority's preference for change
will be ignored.
It is difficult to understand why Buchanan posits the
recognition of intensity of preference as a unique virtue of a
unanimity requirement. Accounting for intensity of preferences
is generally an argument in favor of a majority, rather than a
unanimity, rule. In a majority regime, those with intense
preferences can express them through logrolling, in essence the
purchase of the votes of those slightly affected by those more
greatly affected in return for a similar purchase when the levels
of intensity are reversed." 6 In our example, logrolling could
114 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 154; see supra text accompanying notes
108-13.
115 Buchanan does not explore the category of special relationships, e.g.,
those based upon affective or status ties, that are exceptions to the rule that
individuals are discrete market agents. Thus, the existence of non-market
duties of beneficence that recognize such special relationships also remains
generally unexplored. Although Buchanan does not discuss the duty to rescue
doctrine within which my example arguably falls, Richard Epstein, who does
examine it, rejects such a duty because, inter alia, it is extendable to a duty on
the part of the rich to succor the poor, and is thus redistributive. Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 203 (1973).
..6 Buchanan is ambivalent about the virtues of logrolling. While he has
praised it as an effective tool of minorities, he has also noted that it is one of
the vices of majoritarianism. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TuLLOCK, supra note 28,
at 132-45; Buchanan, supra note 7, at 449.
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have won the poor person majority support. But, under a
unanimity rule, there is little to trade, for the satisfied hold-out
can never lose her veto and thus need not bargain for the
support of others." 7
2. Unanimity, Coercion and Market Outcomes
A legislative outcome is a decision by representatives of the
parties to select an outcome and impose it. 118  The test
Buchanan enunciates with respect to Miller v. Schoene judges
the acceptability of legislative coercion by whether it is directed
toward the achievement of the same outcome that the market
would reach if it could." 9 But a distinction between legisla-
tion that achieves a market solution and that which does not
may not be coherent. A forced transaction that the parties
might have made is not necessarily the same result the market
would have achieved.
What compensation would the cedar tree owners have
demanded in the market? What price would the apple tree
owners have paid? There are a variety of solutions, realizing
gains from trade, that might have been reached in the market.
But if a market solution is not available, we cannot judge how
well a legislative solution duplicates it. In the apple and cedar
tree case, we do not know - and cannot know - what solution
would have emerged in the market. A forced transfer requires
cedar tree owners to sell to apple tree owners, regardless of
whether they would actually have done so in a market-driven
process and regardless of how they would have divided surplus
in face-to-face bargaining. It is easy to say that if the value of
the apple crop is less than the value of the cedar trees, the
cedar tree owners need not sell. But we cannot know, lacking a
market, whether the cedar tree owners are truly unsatisfied
with the offered price, or are simply holding out.
The answer might be that, so long as the result is mutually
beneficial, it is definitionally a potential market outcome.
However, strategic behavior may take place not only between
... Of course, should the satisfied hold-out become unsatisfied and seek
some redistributive outcome, he might then be forced to bargain for other
votes. However, assuming that the person whom the status quo serves best is
satisfied, that person will never need to bargain.
118 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 446-48.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
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the representatives of apple and cedar tree owners, but also
within the two groups. The collective of owners on each side
may have reached its position only by imposing a solution upon
individuals within each collective. Each group's bargaining
position itself represents the outcome of a coerced negotiation.
Thus, even a result which appears to be unanimous may be
distorted by coercion.
Negotiation between representatives of the two sides, rather
than the concerned individuals themselves, creates a second
level of analysis. We have to not only identify the market
outcome in a negotiation between the organizations, but also to
identify the result where the individual members of an organi-
zation constitute a market among themselves. This analysis
may reveal that individuals within each organization are forced
to accept an outcome they would not have chosen themselves,
an outcome without a market equivalent. Buchanan eludes this
problem by simply assuming that representation of individuals
is achieved unanimously, without discussion of how this process
occurs. 2 ' But, assuming unanimity among a constituency in
order to legitimize its representatives' unanimous behavior begs
the question.
The problems of strategic behavior implicit in reaching a
unanimous legislative solution also exist when the collective
entity is private. Buchanan himself recognizes that "Is]trict
adherence to a rule of unanimity in ... [such a] body is not
practicable... [due to] the opportunities for strategic bargain-
ing."121 Strategic behavior, in the form of defection from un-
enforceable agreements, is precisely what necessitated the
creation of the state as an instrument of coercion. The inability
to achieve important private bargains is what led to the creation
of a public order. Thus, insisting that both the public and
private order be unanimous simply repeats the dilemma with
which the public order began.
3. When is Coercion Appropriate?
Buchanan admits some coercion into his conception of the
state because it is otherwise impossible to deal with strategic
behavior. Implicit is the notion that it is possible to sort deci-
sions that are appropriately unanimous - those that forestall
20 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 446-47.
" Id. at 447.
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strategic behavior - from those that are not - those that
impose a net loss on a minority. Buchanan assumes that the
constitutional contractors in fact did so in allowing non-unanim-
ity into their state.'22 But he is not clear on the appropriate
conditions for making such a sort. It would seem that unanimi-
ty is most difficult to achieve for precisely those decisions that
would be most costly to the minority. Under what circumstanc-
es would one be willing to forego one's veto on just the decision
most likely to be devastating?
Buchanan says that those legislative decisions "which
modify or restrict the structure of individual human or property
rights after these have once been defined and generally accept-
ed,"'23 should be unanimous, while others need not be.
Buchanan does not describe the "other" category - decisions
that may be non-unanimous - any more specifically than as
"those most characteristically undertaken by governments." 24
They are defined by example: education, fire safety, mosquito
control, and police.'25 These decisions apparently do not im-
plicate individual human or property rights; thus, the parties to
the constitutional contract will not require unanimity.'26
It is difficult to use this distinction as a practical guide to
separate those decisions which must be unanimous and those
which need not be. We can easily create scenarios in which the
decision to provide services from the "other" category implicates
privileged rights. If, for example, a community votes by a
majority to provide segregated education to a minority, it would
appear that individual human rights are implicated. Similarly,
a majority decision to provide police and fire protection to some
citizens' property and to expose others' property to danger would
affect basic property rights. These examples merely suggest the
practical difficulty in defining the categories to which non-
unanimity rules might apply in collective decision-making. The
122 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 151-54.
123 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 28, at 73.
124 Id. at 74-75.
12 Buchanan himself, however, also refers to the organization of fire
services as a "purely voluntary [hence unanimous] co-operative action." Id. at
49. This illustrates the difficulty of appropriately sorting unanimous from
non-unanimous decision-making.
126 Elsewhere, however, Buchanan states that "any departure from
unanimity in collective decision processes modifies the structure of rights."
BUCHANAN, supra note 43, at 165.
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constitutional contractors would find it difficult to carve out a
coherent category of government decisions which did not impli-
cate someone's individual rights.
One answer might be to claim that decisions the original
constitutional contractors determine do not require unanimity
do not affect individual rights. One need merely assume that
the contractors, already-nervous holders of differing amounts of
wealth and resources at the time of the initial contract, were
unlikely to omit from the category of unanimous decision-mak-
ing any really important claims and must have converted them
all into rights. This is functionally useful, but theoretically
subversive. It is equivalent to deciding that the original con-
tract created, rather than recognized, the initial distribution, a
formulation Buchanan has rejected.12 Since the original dis-
tribution of property is said to occur pre-politically, public choice
theory can hardly accept this sleight-of-hand.
The long and short of the matter is that the only justifica-
tion for non-unanimous action is a functional one: it is neces-
sary to defeat strategic behavior. There is no assurance that
coercion will be used exclusively to achieve market outcomes
and not to impose costs on participants. If the justification for
the coercive legislative state is providing public goods and
eliminating public bads when the market fails, there appears no
coherent argument that coercion is process- rather than out-
come-based. Volition is not at center stage; the centrality of the
market as a measure for political action is lost.
In sum, the requirement of unanimity in political decision-
making cannot be shown to be compatible with coercion or more
democratic than majoritarianism. It neither achieves a height-
ened democracy nor solves the problem of providing public goods
volitionally. It appears that the signal result of insistence upon
unanimity as a predicate for collective action is preservation of
the status quo.
IV. REFORMING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTRACT
A. RECOGNIZING THE DANGER
A state may solve free-rider or hold-out problems through
majoritarian coercion, but the coercive potential of majoritarian
I See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
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voting rules also allows the state to redistribute resources. We
can categorize coercive decisions based on their potential for
unanimity. First, there are those decisions that might have
been unanimous because they produce gains for all. Second,
there are those decisions that would never have been unani-
mous because they redistribute, thus assigning net loss to some
and net gain to others.
The first category contains coerced decisions like the resolu-
tion of the apple/cedar tree dispute. A result is reached from
which even hold-outs will benefit, though less than they would
have had they been able to continue to hold out. 28  In the
second category are decisions Buchanan calls "unconstrained"
non-unanimous choices. Here, "[c]ontrol over the collective
decision-making apparatus becomes the instrument for securing
the winnings of a zero-sum component of the game of poli-
tics." 29 Unconstrained decision-making amounts to a return
to the pre-contractual situation of predation and defense. "To
the extent that collective action ... break[s] beyond the bound-
aries imposed by the mutuality of gains from exchange, both
direct and indirect, 30 the community has taken a major step
backward into the anarchistic jungle ... ."' Although no
rational contractor would agree to an unconstrained decision-
rule at the constitutional moment, the current historical context
indicates that we have devolved into a period of such unconst-
raint as "the structure of individual and collective
rights ... [has] eroded over time.' 3 2
Once the mechanism of legislative coercion has been creat-
ed, it is difficult to police. As we have seen, the initial, or
"natural," distribution of property was pre-constitutional.131
The application-of a non-unanimity rule in the legislative state
thus represents the first opportunity for coercive redistribution
ex post the constitutional contract, which was intended to stop
" See BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 43-44. But see supra text accompany-
ing note 120.
'2 Id. at 49.
130 In using the terminology "indirect" gains, Buchanan means that
resolving holdout problems benefits, in the long run and indirectly, the holdout
as well as everybody else. See id. at 44-48.
131 d. at 50.
132 Id. The evidence of non-constraint suggests "that general agreement
could be attained for genuine constitutional revision." Id. at 51.
13 See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
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involuntary redistribution. When non-unanimity is possible,
"there is necessarily an opportunity offered to those who would
use politics for predation, who would leap outside of any bound-
aries defined by the range of mutuality of advantage."'
The apple tree owner who can be coerced when her agree-
ment is withheld because she seeks to avoid contribution to
obtain a mutually-beneficial public good, like eliminating dis-
eased cedar trees, can also be coerced when her agreement to a
measure is withheld because she would suffer a net loss. The
coercive state differs from the market in this respect: when the
state acts, there may be both winners and losers. The state
may coerce loss because the participants have agreed to give to
that aggregative mechanism certain coercive powers that the
marketplace is thought to lack. While market participation can
only result in benefits to all participants, the majoritarian state
can coerce an individual to absorb a loss based on aggregate
preferences, regardless of that individual's preference.
For Buchanan, the paradox of the majoritarian state is that
it is created voluntarily to protect and enhance market partici-
pation, but its power to overcome predation and market failure
is inevitably available for redistributive ends, which are in
themselves a form of the predation and inefficiency the state
was created to eliminate. The majoritarian political process is
one of "political exchanges,"'3 5 in which coerced redistribution
is offered for sale by politicians and purchased by interest
groups who demand and can afford it. The consequence of the
state's ability to coerce individuals is that a "potentiality of
exchange, ' i.e., a market, exists for coercive redistributive
decisions of the state.
The spontaneous order of a functioning economic market
does not emerge in the political marketplace.' "[T]here is no
invisible hand operative in majoritarian political institutions
analogous to that operative in the market setting .
'4BUCHANAN, supra note 14, at 90.
13 Id. at 90.
16 BUCHANAN, supra note 59, at 21, 31.
137 Buchanan is cutting about economists who subscribe to a passive view
of institutional change. "[Gireat damage has been and is being done by
modem economists who argue, indirectly, that basic institutional change will
somehow spontaneously evolve in the direction of structural efficiency."
BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 149 n.11.
13 Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral?
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Thus, "Etlo improve politics, it is necessary to improve or reform
the rules."
13 9
B. REJECTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
The specter of majority rule threatening minorities is not a
new fear.4 ° The framers had a similar concern and adopted
judicial review, a clearly undemocratic mechanism, as one check
on majorities.' 4 ' Buchanan originally rejected judicial review
as a means to restrain democracy. Unlike some other pub-
lic choice theorists," he did not advocate judicial monitoring
of the economy. "There is no role for the judiciary in the deci-
sion relating to the supply and financing of a public good."'
Buchanan would have no truck with proposals for judicial
review as a mechanism for overcoming rent-seeking. "The
judicial role should... [be] limited strictly to a determination of
the constitutionality of legislative action, and this should not
... include[] any attempt at making a judgment as to the
economic efficiency or inefficiency or to the equity or inequity of
the legislative choice actually made."'4
Indeed, much of Buchanan's work is a reaction to what he
perceives as the disruption of the original constitutional com-
pact, first by the regulation of the New Deal 4 and, more pow-
The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 184 (1988).
139 BUCHANAN, supra note 25, at 18.
140 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 1803).
141 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 131 (James Madison) (B. Wright
ed., 1961).
142 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 7, at 447-50.
143 See, e.g., William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regula-
tion of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to
Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 400 (1988) (noting that courts should treat
all legislative outcomes as possibly the result of arbitrary processes and
examine all legislation for potential violation of rights); see also Jonathan R.
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 223 (1986) (arguing that
courts should interpret statutes as though legislators actually intended the
stated public-regarding purpose, even though the true purpose was to benefit
special interests).
'44 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 447.
145 Id. at 450.
14 Buchanan actually locates the original Fall in 1913, when the progres-
sive income tax was constitutionalized. "This amendment was critically
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erfully, by the judicial activism of the '60s, that "bizarre de-
cade."'147 "[T]he role that has been assumed by the federal
judiciary must be recognized to be grossly violative of the
conceptual separation between constitutional contract and its
enforcement on the one hand and between the enforcing agent
and the productive state on the other."' 8 The judiciary itself
became a face of Leviathan, "assum[ing] the authority to rewrite
the basic constitutional contract, to change 'the law' at [its] own
will""' 9 and "tak[ing] on legislative roles and effectively dis-
plac[ing] representative assemblies in making decisions on
'public good.""5  The judiciary's proper role is acting as the
arm of the umpire-state, determining "whether or not the rules
have been violated, whether or not a rule exists, whether or not
a rule applies to this or that case." '' Judges, Buchanan add-
ed, "must come to have respect for limits."'52
After the Reagan Revolution failed to achieve the type of
fundamental constitutional change that Buchanan believed to be
-urgently necessary, 5 ' he revised his opinion of judicial review.
He called upon the judiciary, if not to change the constitution
itself, then to change its interpretation to afford greater protec-
tion to property. The judiciary should interpret the constitu-
tion's takings clause broadly and in a fashion that would, in
essence, incorporate Buchanan's proposals for unanimity and
constitutional reform. "Any legislatively orchestrated change
that upsets the legitimately-held expectations of citizens should
important because income tax provided a source of revenue that would grow
disproportionately with the growth in national income, either real or nominal."
JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Post-Reagan Political Economy, in CONSTrrTUTIONAL
ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 1, 8.
147 Id. at 8.
148 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 106.
149 Id. at 163.
1r)o Id.
.
51 James M. Buchanan, Contractarian Political Economy and Constitution-
al Interpretation, Draft of Address Before the American Economics
Association 7 (Dec. 1987) (on file with author).
152 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 164. It is interesting to note that
Buchanan's unhappiness with the political system is limited to the legislative
and judicial branches. So far as I am aware, he has not critically examined
the executive branch.
"a "I assess the Reagan presidency as one of failed opportunity to secure
the structural changes that might have been within the realms of the politic-
ally possible." BUCHANAN, supra note 146, at 1.
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be interpreted as a change in the constitutional structure, and,
as such, should be prevented by the courts."'"
The judiciary, it appears, is barred from activism in respect
to change, but should act to fix the world, in the lepidopterist's
sense; that is, to preserve the status quo. The argument seems
to be, as Horwitz states in respect to its nineteenth-century
version, "that one ha[s] a property right to an unchanging
world."'55 The idea that the judiciary may only act to resist
change, and not to implement it, places the status quo' at
the heart of Buchanan's view of state and law: "The function of
the judiciary is protection of that which is .... ' 7
C. CHANGING THE RULES
If we are to move out of the jungle, the agency of change
will not be the judiciary. Buchanan, despite his bias for the
status quo, calls for a change more profound than the mere
reinstitution of judicial review of economic regulation. He seeks
change that will strengthen the bonds of property. "[W]e are
now seeking to reimpose constitutional limits on government
over and beyond those exercised through democratic electoral
constraints."'58 Only a constitution - an ex ante promise to
be bound - can protect the polity against the collective irratio-
nality of inevitably self-seeking individuals. A constitution is
the exit from the prisoner's dilemma; mere voting is too weak to
constrain government.' 59 "[Clonstitutional constraints on gov-
ernmental behavior can be effective, even if direct electoral
controls are not."'6 9
While Buchanan sometimes claims merely to uphold the
framers' version of "bounds on the exercise of majoritarian
democracy,"'' ultimately he argues that the framers' constitu-
tion must be changed since it has not prevented the rise of the
15 Buchanan, supra note 151, at 12.
'a HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 151.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
517 Buchanan, supra note 151, at 13.
15 BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 20.
159 James M. Buchanan & H. Geoffrey Brennan, Monopoly in Money and
Inflation, in CONsTITUTIONAL ECONOMICs, supra note 12, at 53-54.
'60 Id. at 55.
161 BUCHANAN, supra note 12, at 36.
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regulatory state. He regrets this necessity, for if "stable and
tolerable rules exist, a community may be better off not to
attempt change."'62 But stricter limits must be imposed: "We
must come to agree that democratic societies, as they now
operate, will self-destruct ... unless the rules of the political
game are changed.'
163
Buchanan's prescription is constitutional reform. Fixed
substantive rules restricting legislatures to the creation of
general benefits would diminish the returns available from rent-
seeking behavior. Among the constitutional changes Buchanan
was disappointed not to have seen during the Reagan and Bush
presidencies were a balanced-budget amendment and limits on
monetary authority (presumably the Federal Reserve Bank).'
Such changes are a means by which "the revenue-grabbing
proclivities of governments might be disciplined by ... con-
straints imposed on tax bases and rates."'65  The balanced-
budget amendment is a life-or-death matter: "My diagnosis of
American society is ... that we are living during a period of
erosion of the 'social capital' that provides the basic framework
for our culture, our economy, and our polity ... .166
But how can we know what changes to the rules will im-
prove them? To understand Buchanan's extraordinary answer,
we must examine his notion of what validates rules ex post the
constitutional moment; that is, when the original contractors
are long gone and those who were never party to the contract
are nonetheless charged with adherence to it. Buchanan
expects adherence to the rules laid down: "[J]ust conduct is, at
least presumptively, conduct obedient to prevailing rules."'67
What makes existing rules legitimate post-contract is simply
that each generation follows them. "A rule is legitimate, and
violations of it constitute unjust behavior, when the rule is the
object of voluntary consent among participants in the rule-
governed order."'68 This consent amounts to a new promise.
16 2 BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 11.
165 Id. at 150.
' BUCHANAN, supra note 146, at 4.
16 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy:
The Development of Public Choice, in CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note
12, at 29, 42.
16 BUCHANAN, Moral Community, supra note 50, at 108.
' BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 100.
16 Id. Buchanan does not expressly indicate if the consent requires
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"[R]ules may be considered to be given tacit consent simply by
virtue of their history or regular observance - even if there is
no effective option to not playing and participation is involun-
tary in that sense.'
169
Rules can change, however, if those bound by them decide
they are unjust. Unjust rules are rules that do not comport
with meta-rules, the "abstract rules that apply to the choice
among rules."'7 °  In turn, Buchanan explains that "justice
among meta-rules is a matter of justice within meta-meta-rules,
and so on."'' What differentiates meta-rules from ordinary
rules is that the framers agreed upon the meta-rules in the
original contract, from behind the veil of ignorance.' 2 Meta-
rules are, by definition, consensual and thus just. The result
leaves "individuals... no interests to defend. Any reason that
any one of them has for preferring one set of rules over another
will be a reason for all others to prefer that set of rules as
well.""'  Again, we see the centrality of a neutral original
position and recognize that Buchanan's inability to coherently
postulate such a position undermines his theory.
To explain why change is not a threat to those who benefit
from the status quo, Buchanan resorts to a kind of sleight-of-
hand. Why should people unanimously choose to make constitu-
tional change? Buchanan answers that changing rules will not
harm their current interests, so they have nothing to lose.'
Change in rules is prospective and modifies the future, not the
existing distribution. Thus, the amenders are uncertain about
the consequence of change for themselves and are behind a "veil
of ignorance." This reasoning leads to a kind of Zeno's Paradox:
no change ever harms anyone's current interest, because it will
always take place in the future.'75
unanimity or not.
169 Id. at 104.
170 Id. at 105.
171 Id. at 107. In short, it's turtles all the way up.
172 Id. at 106.
173 Id.
'
74 Id. at 138-40.
" I may be misreading this section and the point is more subtle than it
appears. If so, I can only apologize.
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D. ABANDONING SELF-INTEREST
There is a major internal problem with Buchanan's pre-
scription for thorough-going constitutional reform. Clearly,
"something other than ordinary politics will be required to
generate fiscal and monetary discipline .... ,"176 Although
Buchanan attempts to explain why the amenders would not
think themselves likely to suffer thereby, he offers no affirma-
tive explanation why anyone would participate in such reform.
Indeed, "[tlo the extent that 'investment' in institutional analy-
sis, design, argument, dialogue, discussion, and persuasion is
costly in a personal sense, the individual of the orthodox model
[Homo economicus] will forego such investment in favor of more
immediate gratification of privately directed desires.' 77
Buchanan's plan for constitutional change seems stymied by
the very force that he insists necessitates change, the rational
self-interest of individuals. In 1974, Buchanan appeared to
believe that a rational basis could be found for individual
promotion of constitutional change," 8 but he has since aban-
doned that position. This withdrawal was due to the realization
that some people clearly benefit from the constitutional arrange-
ment that exists and have no interest in change. Homo
economicus, whom Buchanan was "crucial" in introducing to
political theory, 9 must now go to the wall: "To hold out hope
for reform in the basic rules describing the sociopolitical game,
we must introduce elements that violate the self-interest postu-
late.'"'8  Indeed, says Buchanan, "[t]hose of us who have
helped generate the widespread notion that self-interest is an
important political motivation would be extremely irresponsible
if we acquiesce in the inference that reform and reconstruction
are not possible."''
Reform is possible if we assume that people will and should
act on the basis of ethical precepts that might even run counter
to their self-interest. "[B]ecoming informed about, and partici-
176 BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 150.
177 Id. at 145-46.
178 BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 80-81.
179Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in
the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 n.13 (1991).
" BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 146.
181 James M. Buchanan, Quest for a Tempered Utopia, WALL ST. J., Nov.
14, 1986, at A30.
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pating in the discussion of, constitutional rules must reflect the
presence of some ethical precept that transcends rational inter-
est for the individual."'82  These ethical precepts are shared
norms of what is good or right, norms that motivate action,
regardless of individual self-interest. "[Plersons must be alleged
to place positive private value on 'public good' for the whole
community of persons, over and beyond the value placed on
their own individualized or partitioned shares.' 8 3 They will
seek those changes that the public interest requires.
Buchanan's constitutional revolution now relies on the notion,
earlier rejected, that there is indeed a "general 'public interest,"'
or "general interests of all voters," or an "interest ... interp-
reted by a majority of the voters in the electorate"'" and that
this will, not expressed by ordinary politics, can only be cap-
tured by a constitution.
In spite of Buchanan's claimed focus on process, we are
thrust back into the world of outcomes and end-results.
Buchanan is willing to destabilize his structure due to dissatis-
faction with the current situation, in other words, an outcome.
Having given up the two fundamental postulates of public
choice - the self-interested individual and politics as market
process, not search for good results - Buchanan may be said to
have moved to a position of republicanism, or politics as the
self-conscious and collective effort of a community of other-
regarding individuals to find and promote the common good.'85
He implies as much himself: "It is time to again dream attain-
able dreams, and to recover the faith that dreams can become
realities. It is time to start replacing dystopia with a tempered
utopia."'18
6
182 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Ethics of Constitutional Order, in ESSAYS ON
THE POLInCAL ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 29.
's BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 147.
1 Buchanan & Brennan, supra note 159, at 53-54. Buchanan employs a
variety of terms to describe public will; this hedging indicates some discomfort
with the concept.
18 The man Buchanan identifies as a key intellectual mentor, University
of Chicago economist Frank H. Knight, see BUCHANAN, Better than Plowing,
supra note 80, at 67, ran aground on a similar dilemma, the inability to locate
the place of value in a world of fact. For a brief account of this aspect of
Knight's career, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY; SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 43 (1973).
18 Buchanan, supra note 181. The other leading contractarian theorist to
have rejected Posnerian law and economics, Richard A. Epstein, has avoided
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CONCLUSION
At first blush, such a terminus to such a journey is surpris-
ing. But, on reflection, it was predictable given the unexpressed
and unquestioned assumptions that were always implicit in
Buchanan's preference for the market over the state and for
unanimity over majoritarianism. The most fundamental as-
sumption is that uncompensated redistribution is wrong.18
This central assumption of classic liberalism lies at the heart of
Buchanan's opposition to majoritarianism. 88  Although
Buchanan recognizes that unsavory circumstances produced the
"natural distribution" 89 he nonetheless exalts that distribu-
tion. Buchanan never questions the assumption that any
subsequent non-unanimous redistribution is unjustifiable. Yet,
without a reasoned justification for the initial distribution, the
argument for excluding redistribution from the scope of permis-
sible non-unanimous state action is merely conclusory, or worse,
a pretext for preserving the status quo.
Buchanan might respond that the impermissibility of
redistribution is not based on an outcome-based allegiance to
the status quo. Instead, like the permissibility of coercion, it
rests on the process-based notion that there is a difference
between coercion to achieve results the marketplace might have
produced, i.e., those entailing gains for all, and coercion to
achieve results like redistribution that would never be achiev-
able in the market. These are the two categories, mutually
exclusive, within which state coercion is utilized. Only the
former, according to Buchanan, is the legitimate and intended
use of the coercive instrument the original contractors created.
Redistribution is impermissible because it cannot be achieved
volitionally.
the route of constitutional change. He argues that the constitution does not
require amending in order to prevent rent-seeking, only different interpreta-
tion by the judiciary. Epstein, unlike Buchanan, does not jettison fundamen-
tal assumptions but instead insists that judges do so. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
187 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 29, at 189-99.
'RId. at 190. "[Tlhe essence of the collective-choice process under majority
voting rules is the fact that the minority of voters are forced to accede to
actions which they cannot prevent and for which they cannot claim compensa-
tion for damages resulting." Id. at 189-90.
'
89 See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
19931 275
276 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:229
But this reasoning is based upon yet another profoundly
embedded assumption - that the market, unlike the state, is
non-coercive. The contractarian places the market at the center
of human affairs because it is the product of the aggregation of
individual wills. Every individual has the ability to make
choices in the marketplace. 9 ° While unequal bargaining pow-
er may exist, it is not disabling. In the market, the actor
retains her independence and ability to choose,19' while as
political actor, either citizen or subject, others' choices may force
her to action or non-action.
The identification of coercion with the state and volition
with the market requires acceptance of two propositions - that
economic power may usefully be conceived of as the power of
individuals and that economic power and the state are distinct
from each other. The first proposition is simply untenable,
unless one wishes to argue that the corporation is literally an
individual. 92 Legal Realists like Morris Cohen'93 and Rob-
ert Hale discredited the second notion well before the New
Deal. 94 Indeed, it was as early as 1909 that Roscoe Pound
launched his proto-Realist attack on the Lochner 95 court for
190 To the extent that voluntary exchange among persons is
valued positively while coercion is valued negatively, there emerges
the implication that substitution of the former for the latter is
desired, presuming, of course, that such substitution is technologi-
cally feasible and is not prohibitively costly in resources. This
implication provides the normative thrust for the proclivity of the
public-choice economist to favor market-like arrangements where
these seem feasible, and to favor decentralization of political author-
ity in appropriate situations.
BUCHANAN, supra note 25, at 17.
191 Buchanan only views unequal bargaining power as coercive in cases of
extreme duress. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 102.
192 Even Buchanan could not make this argument since corporate gover-
nance has not been subject to a unanimity rule since the last decade of the
nineteenth century, at the very latest. See, e.g., Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 202
(1985).
193 Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
" Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly-Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. REV. 470 (1923). For further discussion of both Hale and
Cohen, see HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 163-64.
195 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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its formulation of "an academic theory of equality [of market
actors] in the face of practical conditions of inequality."'96
The Realists recognized, as Buchanan would later, that the
state protects property rights not only by abstaining from
interference with the owner, but also by coercing the non-inter-
ference of non-owners.' 97 But the Realists carried the logic of
the statement inexorably forward to conclude that state protec-
tion of property rights affects and effects market outcomes. Just
as the post-constitutional state created by property-holding
contractors is structured by the owners' attempts to protect
their holdings, so the market is structured by prior distribu-
tions, those made possible by state recognition of entitlements.
Even if the state's sole function were to protect private
property, and it undertook no further activities, the market
would not be separate from the state. State recognition of legal
entitlements would shape the market. Buchanan impliedly
concedes this point when he recognizes that the market cannot
proceed without the state and makes that recognition the basis
of his discussion of the creation of the constitutional com-
pact. 9 8 This link between the state and the market is a point
the Realists made again and again:
The owner of every dollar has, by virtue of his law-
created right of ownership, a certain amount of
influence over the channels into which industry shall
flow .... The channels of industry are governed by the
'democratic voting' [citation omitted] of those who vote
with their dollars .... It must be obvious that the
individuals with the most dollars exercise the most
control over the channels,' 99
said Robert Hale. Morris Cohen took Hale's logic a step farther:
if the state is implicated with the market by virtue of the
protection of private property, then private property is implicat-
ed with the state. "Property," said Cohen, "[is] sovereign power
compelling service and obedience. 2 °0 The clear line between
property and sovereignty, between state and market, a line dear
' Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909).
197 Id. at 471.
8 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61, 72-74.
199 Hale, supra note 194, at 490-91.
200 Cohen, supra note 193, at 12.
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to the formalist proposition of the separation of public and
private law, does not exist.
The Realists recognized that the categorical separation of a
coercive state and a volitional marketplace was not a neutral
assumption but rather part of what another Realist, Thurman
Arnold, identified as the "folklore of capitalism."20 ' That sepa-
ration was based upon the exclusion of context, a requirement
that may serve as an informal definition of formalism. Only by
decontextualizing the market, by isolating it from its past and
its future, could formalists conclude that market outcomes are
necessarily neutral and apolitical. We are accustomed to as-
suming that this sort of legal formalism disappeared with the
New Deal and the acceptance of Keynesianism. But, as Robert
Gordon has shown, every kind of legal thinking remains avail-
able in every era.2 2 Formalism too has its present-day advo-
cates, of whom, it appears, Buchanan is one.
201 "[Plrinciples of law and economics ... were considered as inescapable
truths, as natural laws, as principles of justice, and as the only method of an
ordered society. This is a characteristic of all vital folklore or religion."
THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 46 (1937).
202 See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1017 (1980).
